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he United States criminal justice system is the largest in the world. At yearend 
2011, approximately 7 million individuals were under some form of 
correctional control in the United States, including 2.2 million incarcerated in 
federal, state, or local prisons and jails.1 The U.S. has the highest incarceration rate in 
the world, dwarfing the rate of nearly every other nation.2 
 
Such broad statistics mask the racial disparity that pervades the U.S. criminal justice 
system. Racial minorities are more likely than white Americans to be arrested; once 
arrested, they are more likely to be convicted; and once convicted, they are more likely 
to face stiff sentences. African-American males are six times more likely to be 
incarcerated than white males and 2.5 times more likely than Hispanic males.3 If current 
trends continue, one of every three black American males born today can expect to go 
to prison in his lifetime, as can one of every six Latino males—compared to one of 
every seventeen white males.4 Racial and ethnic disparities among women are less 
substantial than among men but remain prevalent.5 
 
The source of such disparities is deeper and more systemic than explicit racial 
discrimination. The United States in effect operates two distinct criminal justice 
systems: one for wealthy people and another for poor people and minorities. The 
former is the system the United States describes in its report: a vigorous adversary 
system replete with constitutional protections for defendants. Yet the experiences of 
poor and minority defendants within the criminal justice system often differ 
substantially from that model due to a number of factors, each of which contributes to 
the overrepresentation of such individuals in the system. As Georgetown Law Professor 
David Cole states in his book No Equal Justice, 
 
These double standards are not, of course, explicit; on the face of it, the criminal law is 
color-blind and class-blind. But in a sense, this only makes the problem worse. The 
rhetoric of the criminal justice system sends the message that our society carefully 
                                                 
1 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2011, 1, 3 tbl.2 (Nov. 2012). 
2 See International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief (2013). 
3 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2011, 8 tbl.8 (Dec. 2012). 
4 Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 supp. 3 The Prison Journal 87S, 88S (Sept. 
2011) (hereinafter Mauer). 
5 Id. 
T 
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protects everyone’s constitutional rights, but in practice the rules assure that law 
enforcement prerogatives will generally prevail over the rights of minorities and the poor. 
By affording criminal suspects substantial constitutional rights in theory, the Supreme 
Court validates the results of the criminal justice system as fair. That formal fairness 
obscures the systemic concerns that ought to be raised by the fact that the prison 
population is overwhelmingly poor and disproportionately black.6 
 
By creating and perpetuating policies that allow such racial disparities to exist in its 
criminal justice system, the United States is in violation of its obligations under Article 2 
and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to ensure that 
all its citizens—regardless of race—are treated equally under the law. The Sentencing 
Project notes that the Committee has specifically asked the U.S. government to address 
the racial disparities in its criminal justice system in paragraph 4 of its List of Issues. We 
welcome this opportunity to provide the Committee with an accurate portrait of the 
current racial disparity in the U.S. criminal justice system. 
 
Established in 1986, The Sentencing Project works for a fair and effective U.S. criminal 
justice system by promoting reforms in sentencing policy, addressing unjust racial 
disparities and practices, and advocating for alternatives to incarceration. Staff of The 
Sentencing Project have testified before the U.S. Congress and state legislative bodies 
and have submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court of the United States on 
various issues related to incarceration and criminal justice policy. The organization’s 
research findings are regularly relied upon by policymakers and covered by major news 
outlets. 
 
This report chronicles the racial disparity that permeates every stage of the United 
States criminal justice system, from arrest to trial to sentencing. In particular, the report 
highlights the influence of implicit racial bias and recounts the findings of the 
burgeoning scholarship on the role of such bias in the criminal justice system. The 
report then details the ways in which the Supreme Court of the United States has 
curtailed potential remedies by discounting the importance of implicit bias and requiring 
that intentional discrimination be proven in constitutional challenges.  Finally, the 
report offers recommendations on ways that federal, state, and local officials in the 
United States can work to eliminate racial disparity in the criminal justice system and 
uphold its obligations under the Covenant. 
                                                 
6 David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal Justice System, 8-9 (1999) 
(hereinafter Cole). 
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RACIAL DISPARITY IN POLICE ACTIVITY 
Roughly 12% of the United States population is black. Yet in 2011, black Americans 
constituted 30% of persons arrested for a property offense and 38% of persons arrested 
for a violent offense.7 Black youths account for 16% of all children in America yet 
make up 28% of juvenile arrests.8 
  
One contributing factor to the disparity in arrest rates is that racial minorities commit 
certain crimes at higher rates. Specifically, data suggests that black Americans—
particularly males—tend to commit violent and property crimes at higher rates than 
other racial groups.9 Other studies, however, demonstrate that higher crime rates are 
better explained by socioeconomic factors than race: extremely disadvantaged 
neighborhoods experience higher rates of crime regardless of racial composition. 10 
Because African Americans constitute a disproportionate share of those living in 
poverty in the United States,11 they are more likely to reside in low-income 
communities in which socioeconomic factors contribute to higher crime rates. As such, 
Ohio State University researchers Lauren Krivo and Ruth Peterson found that “it is 
these differences in disadvantage that explain the overwhelming portion of the 
difference in crime, especially violent crime, between white and African American 
communities.”12 
  
A close examination of some other areas of the law demonstrates that higher crime 
rates cannot fully account for the racial disparity in arrest rates. A growing body of 
scholarship suggests that a significant portion of such disparity may be attributed to 
implicit racial bias, the unconscious associations humans make about racial groups. 
Implicit biases (commonly referred to as stereotypes) are activated when individuals 
must make fast decisions with imperfect information; biases—regardless of their 
accuracy—“fill in” missing information and allow individuals to make decisions in the 
                                                 
7 FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Crime in the United States, 2011, tbl.43A, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-43 (Sept. 2012). 
8 National Council on Crime and Delinquency, And Justice for Some: Differential Treatment of Youth of Color in 
the Justice System, 3 (2007). 
9 See Cole at 41-42. 
10 See Lauren Krivo & Ruth Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban Crime, 75 Soc. F. 
619 (1996) (hereinafter Krivo & Peterson). 
11 See Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the United States 
of America, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006). 
12 Krivo & Peterson at 642. 
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limited time allowed.13 Extensive research has shown that in such situations the vast 
majority of Americans of all races implicitly associate black Americans with adjectives 
such as “dangerous,” “aggressive,” “violent,” and “criminal.”14 Since the nature of law 
enforcement frequently requires police officers to make snap judgments about the 
danger posed by suspects and the criminal nature of their activity, subconscious racial 
associations influence the way officers perform their jobs. 
 
The effects of racial bias are particularly well demonstrated in the areas of traffic stops 
and drug law enforcement. Between 1980 and 2000, the U.S. black drug arrest rate rose 
from 6.5 to 29.1 per 1,000 persons; during the same period, the white drug arrest rate 
increased from 3.5 to 4.6 per 1,000 persons.15 Yet the disparity between the increase in 
black and white drug arrests does not correspond to any significant disparity in black 
drug activity. In 2012, for instance, the National Institute on Drug Abuse published a 
study surveying drug usage among secondary school students in the United States from 
1975-2011. The study found that white students were slightly more likely to have 
abused an illegal substance within the past month than black students.16 Yet from 1980-
2010, black youth were arrested for drug crimes at rates more than double those of 
white youth.17 Disparity between black drug activity and black arrest rates is also 
present in adult populations: in Seattle in 2002, for instance, African Americans 
constituted 16% of observed drug dealers for the five most dangerous drugs but 64% of 
drug dealing arrests for those drugs.18 While these arrests were for trafficking rather 
than possession, the modest evidence available suggests that most drug users purchase 
drugs from a dealer of their own race.19 
 
Data on traffic stops also demonstrates the influence of racial bias on law enforcement 
practices and arrest rates. In the U.S. Department of Justice’s report on Contacts Between 
                                                 
13 See, e.g.,, Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent 
Offenders, 28 Law & Hum. Behav. 483, 485 (2004). 
14 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 876, 876 (2004). 
15 Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 
Criminology 105, 106 (2006). 
16 National Institute on Drug Abuse, Monitoring the Future: National Survey Results on Drug Use, 1975-2011, 
130 tbl.4-7 (2012). 
17 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Law Enforcement and Juvenile Crime, available at 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05274 (Dec. 2012). 
18 Beckett, 44 Criminology at 117 tbl.2. The five drugs observed were methamphetamine, heroin, powder 
cocaine, crack cocaine, and ecstasy. 
19 K. Jack Riley, National Institute of Justice, Crack, Powder Cocaine, and Heroin: Drug Purchase and Use 
Patterns in Six Major U.S. Cities, 1 (Dec. 1997). 
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Police and the Public released in 2011, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that while 
white, black, and Hispanic drivers were stopped at similar rates nationwide, black 
drivers were three times as likely to be searched during a stop as white drivers and twice 
as likely as Hispanic drivers.20 Furthermore, black drivers were twice as likely to 
experience the use or threat of violent force at the hands of police officers than both 
white and Hispanic drivers.21 Such statistics are consistent with research indicating that 
the implicit racial association of black Americans with dangerous or aggressive behavior 
significantly increases police officers’ willingness to employ violent or even deadly force 
against them.22 
 
The national statistics mask greater disparities in some locales. In one New Jersey study, 
racial minorities made up 15% of drivers on the New Jersey Turnpike, yet 42% of stops 
and 73% of arrests made by police were of black drivers—even though white drivers 
and racial minorities violated traffic laws at almost identical rates. Other data from New 
Jersey showed that whites were less likely to be viewed as suspicious by police—even 
though stopped white drivers were twice as likely to be carrying illegal drugs as stopped 
black drivers and five times as likely to be carrying contraband as stopped Hispanic 
drivers.23 In Volusia County, Florida, 148 hours of video footage documenting more 
than 1,000 highway stops by state troopers showed that only five percent of drivers on 
the roads were racial minorities but minorities constituted more than eighty percent of 
the people stopped and searched by police.24 The police practice of targeting minority 
drivers has become so widespread that many black communities have begun referring 
to the phenomenon as “DWB” or “driving while black.”25 
 
The most widely publicized example of racial profiling in recent times is the “stop and 
frisk” tactic employed by the New York Police Department (NYPD). African 
Americans constitute 25% and Hispanic Americans constitute 29% of New York City’s 
population.26 Yet between 2010 and 2012, 52% of those stopped by the NYPD during 
                                                 
20 Christine Eith & Matthew R. Durose, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Contacts Between Police and Public, 2008, 
1 (Oct. 2011). 
21 Id. at 12 tbl.18. 
22 See Joshua Correll et al., The influence of stereotypes on decisions to shoot, 37 Eur. J. of Soc. Psy. 1102, 1115 
(2007); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially 
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. Personality and Soc. Psy. 1314, 1328 (2002). 
23 Alexander at 133. 
24 David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual 
Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 544, 561 (1997). 
25 Cole at 36. 
26 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010 (2010). 
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“stop and frisk” were black and 32% were Hispanic.27 White New Yorkers are 44% of 
the city’s population,28 but only 9% of those stopped were white.29 Nevertheless, 
among those stopped, arrest rates were virtually the same across races,30 and blacks and 
Hispanics were slightly less likely than whites to be caught with weapons or contraband 
such as drugs.31  
 
NYPD often cites the fact that racial minorities tend to be clustered in neighborhoods 
designated as “high crime areas” to justify racial disparity in stop rates. Yet data 
compiled by Dr. Jeffrey Fagan shows that when New York’s neighborhoods are divided 
into quintiles based on crime rates, NYPD officers cite “high crime area” as the 
justification for stops at nearly identical rates in every quintile.32 In other words, police 
consider neighborhoods with the lowest crime rates to be “high crime areas” just as 
much as neighborhoods with the highest crime rates. The racial disparity in the 
implementation of “stop and frisk” has led to ongoing class action litigation against the 
NYPD led by the Center for Constitutional Rights. In August 2013, U.S. District Court 
Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
promise of equal protection and mandated that the police department implement a 
variety of specific remedies. 
 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN TRIALS 
Contact with law enforcement officials and arrests are merely the first step in minority 
defendants’ journey through the criminal justice system. Once racial minorities enter the 
system, they continue to confront racial bias at every stage of litigation. This section 
highlights the influence of racial bias on all the major actors in a criminal trial: defense 
counsel, prosecutors, judges, and juries. It is important to note that the portions of 
following section that address indigent defense counsel and prosecution are not 
sweeping indictments of all public defenders and prosecutors in the United States. 
Thousands of public defenders and prosecutors work diligently and effectively each day 
to represent their clients and ensure that justice is done in a racially fair manner. 
Nevertheless, data demonstrates that implicit racial bias—in combination with 
                                                 
27 Second Supplemental Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 11 tbl.3, Floyd v. City of New York, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 68790 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)) (hereinafter Fagan). 
28 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2010 (2010). 
29 Fagan at 11 tbl.3. 
30 Id. at 34 tbl.14. Arrest rates were 6.73% for whites, 6.19% for blacks, and 6.36% for Hispanics. 
31 Id. at 35 tbl.15. Weapons or contraband were seized in 2.16% of white stops, 1.43% of black stops, and 1.49% 
of Hispanic stops. 
32 Id at 33 fig.13. 
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challenges caused by inadequate resources and training—influences both indigent 
defense and prosecutorial decisionmaking and contributes to racial disparity in the 
criminal justice system in significant ways. Where current policies allow implicit racial 
bias to go unmonitored and unchecked, they warrant closer scrutiny and present 
opportunities for reform. 
Indigent Defense Counsel 
Fifty years after the celebrated Supreme Court decision Gideon v. Wainwright held that 
indigent defendants have a right to publicly appointed defense counsel in all criminal 
trials,33 U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder declared that “America’s indigent defense 
counsel systems exist in a state of crisis.”34 Most indigent defense agencies are grossly 
understaffed and underfunded. In 2012, more than 70% of public defender offices 
reported that obtaining adequate funding and providing adequate compensation for 
their attorneys were extremely or very challenging to the ability of their office to 
provide indigent defense services.35  
  
An analysis of funding at both the state and federal levels indicates that effective 
indigent defense is not a priority in many jurisdictions in the United States. At the state 
and local level, 15,026 public defenders in 957 indigent defense offices handled 
5,572,450 cases in 2007.36 On average, each office handled 5,823 new cases and each 
public defender handled 371 cases—more than one new case for each day of the year. 
The states spent a total of $2.3 billion on indigent defense in 2007, or $414.55 per 
case.37 Furthermore, of the $5.9 billion in federal grants that agencies could have used 
for indigent defense, fully two thirds of agencies reported that they did not allocate any 
funding for that purpose.38 Indeed, only 54% of agencies reported that they were even 
aware that discretionary funds could be used for indigent defense.39 Of the agencies that 
                                                 
33 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
34 Eric Holder, Remarks at the Justice Department's 50th Anniversary Celebration of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-
1303151.html. 
35 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-569, Indigent Defense: DOJ Could Increase Awareness of Eligible 
Funding and Better Determine the Extent to Which Funds Help Support This Purpose, 10 (May 2012) 
(hereinafter GAO-12-569). 
36 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of Public Defender Officers, 2007, 3 tbl.1 (Sept. 2010). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 29 tbl.8. 
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did allocate grant money to indigent defense, the amount allocated for that purpose 
constituted only 4.7% of their total grant money allocations.40  
  
The crippled state of indigent defense in the United States disproportionately affects 
racial minorities because black and Hispanic defendants are far more likely to need the 
services of a public defender than their white counterparts. The median income for 
black and Hispanic Americans is roughly $20,000 less than the median income for white 
Americans.41 The poverty rate is roughly 25% for both black and Hispanic Americans, 
compared to 9% for white Americans.42 In the criminal justice context, such statistics 
mean that black and Hispanic defendants are often more likely than white defendants to 
rely on an indigent defense system of overworked, underpaid attorneys—therefore 
increasing their chances of being convicted. 
  
The chronic overburdening of public defenders also creates an opportunity for implicit 
racial bias to influence the decisions they make. Because public defenders are 
responsible for many more cases than they can effectively manage, they must decide 
which of their cases will receive the bulk of their limited resources and attention—a 
process called “triage” because of its similarity to that of emergency room doctors in 
deciding which of their patients to treat first. As professors Song Richardson and Phillip 
Goff write, “for most [public defenders], the question is not ‘how do I engage in 
zealous and effective advocacy,’ but rather ‘given that all my clients deserve aggressive 
advocacy, how do I choose among them?’”43 
  
As the law enforcement context demonstrates, implicit racial bias thrives in situations in 
which individuals must make snap judgments with imperfect information, particularly 
when they are cognitively depleted, anxious, or distracted—precisely the type of 
environment in which most public defenders in the United States work on a daily basis. 
Racial bias may affect public defenders’ initial appraisal of which cases are worth their 
time and energy as well as how they interact with their clients.44 While specific research 
has yet to be done on the extent to which implicit racial bias influences the indigent 
                                                 
40 Id. at 32-33 figs.9 & 10. The majority of discretionary grant funding was used for law enforcement purposes. 
See id. at 2-25 figs.5&6. 
41 U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010, 6 tbl.1 
(Sept. 2011). 
42 Id. at 15 tbl.14. 
43 L Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 Yale L.J. 2626, 
2632 (2013). 
44 For an extensive discussion of the ways implicit racial bias may affect each of these areas, see id. at 2635-38. 
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defense system, extensive documentation on the impact of implicit racial bias in similar 
fields strongly suggests that such bias has some impact on public defenders and further 
contributes to racial disparity in the criminal justice system.45 
Prosecution 
The office of prosecutor is regarded by many as the most powerful position in the U.S. 
criminal justice system.46 Prosecutors decide which cases to investigate, which suspects 
to charge, which charges to bring, and which penalties to pursue upon conviction. As 
the U.S. criminal justice system has been flooded with an unprecedented number of 
defendants over the past three decades, prosecutors have become increasingly subject 
to the mounting pressures of “triage” similar to public defenders. While the exercise of 
discretion in such circumstances is not unreasonable, it also creates the opportunity for 
biased decisionmaking that may contribute further to racial disparity. 
 
The racial disparity revealed by several studies of prosecutorial decisions suggests that 
implicit racial bias does in fact influence prosecutors’ decisionmaking. A study 
conducted shortly after the Supreme Court reauthorized the use of capital punishment 
in 1976 found that the probability of a black defendant being indicted for killing a white 
person was more than twice as high as that of a white defendant killing a black person. 
Furthermore, prosecutors were significantly more likely to upgrade cases to felony 
murder status in cases in which defendants were black rather than white.47 Similarly, a 
study conducted in 1993 in Los Angeles found that 95% of the 4,632 crack cocaine 
defendants prosecuted in California state court were black and 100% of the 42 crack 
cocaine defendants prosecuted in federal court were either black or other racial 
minorities.48  
 
One of the most well-studied interactions between racial bias and prosecutorial 
decisionmaking involves substantial assistance departures. Federal law allows 
prosecutors to request that a judge “depart” from the mandatory minimum sentence for 
a crime in a particular case when the defendant has provided “substantial assistance” to 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., Chet D. Schrader & Lawrence M. Lewis, Racial Disparity in Emergency Department Triage, 49 J. 
Emergency Med. 511 (2013); Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence (Inst. for 
the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2764, 2007); Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on 
Decisions to Shoot, 37 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 1102 (2007). 
46 See Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor, 5 (2008) (hereinafter Davis). 
47 William Bowers & Glenn Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 
Crime & Delinq. 563, 611–14 (1980). 
48 Richard Berk & Alec Campbell, Preliminary Data on Race Crack Charging Practices in Los Angeles, 6 Fed. 
Sentencing Rep. 37 (1993). 
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law enforcement. Research shows that prosecutors request substantial assistance 
departures at higher rates for “salvageable” and “sympathetic” defendants—those who 
are white, female, and have children.49 A 2001 analysis of more than 77,000 cases in the 
federal system from 1991 to 1994 revealed that black and Hispanic male defendants 
were significantly less likely to receive substantial assistance departures than white male 
defendants. This disparity remained even when the data was controlled for the severity 
of the offense, prior criminal history, and the specific district court’s sentencing 
tendencies.50 When prosecutors did request substantial assistance departures for 
nonwhite male defendants, the average downward adjustment such defendants received 
was roughly six months less than that for white male defendants.51 Accordingly, 
departures from standard sentencing guidelines accounted for 56% of the total racial 
disparity in sentence lengths in the federal system from 1991-1994.52 
Juries, Trial Judges, and Presumptions of Innocence 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys fulfill important roles in American trials by 
presenting evidence, questioning witnesses, and framing legal issues, but they do not 
make the final determination of guilt or innocence for defendants. In the American 
system, that role falls to the jury or— in some cases in certain jurisdictions—the trial 
judge. One of the most celebrated hallmarks of the United States criminal justice system 
is the presumption of innocence, the concept that defendants are innocent and must be 
treated as such until they are proven guilty in a court of law. Yet a growing body of 
research suggests that implicit racial bias affects trial judges and jury members’ ability to 
evaluate guilt and innocence objectively, skewing their judgment of black defendants’ 
cases toward guilty verdicts regardless of the evidence presented at trial. 
  
In 1986, the Supreme Court held in Batson v. Kentucky that it is unconstitutional for 
prosecutors to strike jurors from a jury in a criminal trial on the basis of race.53 
Nevertheless, the all-white jury remains far too common a phenomenon in the U.S. An 
analysis of juries in death penalty cases in 2001, for instance, found that 25% of the 
                                                 
49 The “salvageable” and “sympathetic” descriptors were coined by I.H. Nagel & S.J Schulhoefer, A tale of three 
cities: An empirical study of charging and bargaining practices under the federal sentencing guidelines, 66 So. 
Cal. L. Rev. 501 (1992). 
50 David Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the Federal Courts, 44 J. 
L. & Econ. 285, 308-09 tbl.10 (2001). 
51 Id. at 311. 
52 Id. at 303. 
53 476 U.S. 79 (2012). 
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examined juries had no black members and roughly 70% had two or fewer.54 The 
authors’ analysis revealed both a strong “white male dominance effect” and a “black 
male presence effect” in cases involving black defendants and white victims: the 
presence of five or more white male jurors dramatically increased the likelihood of 
conviction and subsequent imposition of a death sentence in such cases, while the 
presence of one or more black male jurors substantially reduced the probability of the 
same.55 Furthermore, jury members’ conception of appropriate punishment polarized 
along racial lines in black defendant/white victim cases, with white jurors strongly 
favoring death and black jurors strongly favoring life imprisonment.56 Such racial 
effects were notably absent in capital cases in which the defendant and the victim were 
members of the same race.57 
  
As with other areas of the criminal justice system, research indicates that such racial 
effects are likely more attributable to implicit racial bias and subconscious activation of 
racial stereotypes than to explicit racial discrimination. Because American social norms 
have evolved considerably over the past fifty years, most white American jurors are no 
longer comfortable expressing overt racial prejudice in their decisionmaking. 
Nevertheless, research consistently demonstrates that white jurors are substantially 
more likely to convict black defendants than white defendants based on similar 
evidence.58 Interestingly, University of Michigan researchers Samuel Sommers and 
Phoebe Ellsworth found that white juror racial bias essentially vanishes in cases in 
which race is a salient factor of the trial.59 Sommers and Ellsworth theorize that the 
prominence of racial issues in a trial may serve as a subtle reminder to white jurors to be 
on guard against prejudice in their decisionmaking; when race is non-salient in a trial, 
the same white jurors may let their guard down and allow their decisions to be 
subconsciously affected by racial stereotyping.60 
  
                                                 
54 William Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ 
Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 171, 191 n.99 (2001). 
55 Id. at 193. 
56 Id. at 200. 
57 Id. at 201. 
58 See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against 
Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 Psy. Pub. Pol’y & L. 201, 217 (2001); see also Justin Levinson 
et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 187 
(2010) (finding that mock jurors possessed an implicit association between “black” and “guilty”). 
59 Sommers & Ellsworth at 219. 
60 Id. at 209. 
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A verdict is not immune from the effects of implicit racial bias when it is rendered by a 
trial judge rather than a jury. A 2009 study led by Cornell Law Professors Jeffrey 
Rachlinski and Sheri Johnson found the same—or perhaps even higher—levels of 
implicit racial bias in trial judges as in the general population.61 The authors’ analysis 
further showed that judges’ bias influences their decisions in determining both whether 
to convict defendants and the sentence to impose in each case.62 
 
RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING 
Once minority defendants are convicted, they are likely to be sentenced more harshly 
than white defendants convicted for similar crimes. As in other areas of the criminal 
justice system, much overt racial discrimination in the sentencing process has been 
eliminated over the past decades—yet race remains a significant factor in sentencing 
decisions. In 2000, Professor Cassia Spohn concluded after her comprehensive survey 
of 40 studies covering 30 years of sentencing outcomes at both the state and federal 
levels: 
 
Although it is irrefutable that the primary determinants of sentencing decisions are the 
seriousness of the offense and the offender’s prior criminal record, race/ethnicity and 
other legally irrelevant offender characteristics also play a role. Black and Hispanic 
offenders—and particularly those who are young, male, or unemployed—are more likely 
than their white counterparts to be sentenced to prison; they also may receive longer 
sentences than similarly situated white offenders. Other categories of racial minorities—
those convicted of drug offenses, those who victimize whites, those who accumulate 
more serious prior criminal records, or those who refuse to plead guilty or are unable to 
secure pretrial release—also may be singled out for more punitive treatment. 63 
  
Professor Spohn’s conclusion has been further verified by research conducted over the 
past decade. In his 2001 analysis of 77,236 federal cases from 1991 to 1994, for 
instance, Professor David Mustard found that even when cases were controlled for the 
severity of the offense, the defendant’s prior criminal history, and the specific district 
court’s sentencing tendencies, blacks received sentences 5.5 months longer than whites 
and Hispanics received sentences 4.5 months longer than whites.64 When income was 
                                                 
61 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1195, 1210 
(2009). 
62 Id. at 1220-23. 
63 Cassia Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, 55-
56, available at http://www.justicestudies.com/pubs/livelink3-1.pdf (2000). 
64 Mustard, supra note 50, at 300. Significantly, females of all races received sentences 5.5 months shorter than 
males of all races. 
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considered as a variable, the disparity became even greater: blacks with incomes of less 
than $5,000 were sentenced most harshly of all, receiving sentences that were on 
average 6.2 months longer than other defendants.65 Because the average sentence 
length was 46 months, this data means that poor black defendants received sentences 
on average 13% longer than other defendants.  
Capital Punishment 
Racial disparity is particularly pronounced in cases involving the most severe penalty 
imposed by the U.S. criminal justice system: the death penalty. The United States has 
executed 1,335 individuals66 since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in 
its 1976 decision Gregg v. Georgia.67 As of January 1, 2013, more than 3,100 prisoners 
awaited execution on death row in the U.S.68 Of those, 42% were black.69 
  
Numerous studies have shown that two racial variables affect capital punishment 
sentencing: the race of the perpetrator and the race of the victim. First, defendants 
convicted of the homicide of a white victim are substantially more likely to face the 
death penalty than those convicted of killing nonwhite victims. White people constitute 
half of murder victims in the United States each year,70 but 77% of persons executed 
since 1976 were convicted of killing white victims.71 Comparatively, black people also 
constitute half of murder victims,72 but only 13% of persons executed since 1976 were 
convicted of killing black victims.73 A 1990 Government Accountability Office survey 
of 28 separate studies found that in 82% of the studies, the race of the victim was 
shown to influence the likelihood of a defendant receiving the death penalty, with those 
convicted of murdering white victims more likely to be sentenced to death than those 
convicted of murdering black victims even when the cases were controlled for crime-
specific variables.74 
  
                                                 
65 Id. at 301. 
66 Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976 
(last visited June 13, 2013). 
67 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
68 Deborah Fins, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Death Row USA: Winter 2013, 1 (2013) (hereinafter Death Row 
USA). The exact number was 3,125. 
69 Id. 
70 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008, 3 tbl.1 (November 2011). 
71 Death Row USA at 5. 
72 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United States, 1980-2008, 3 tbl.1 (November 2011). 
73 Death Row USA at 5. 
74 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO GGD-90-557, Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern 
of Racial Disparities, 5 (Feb. 1990) (hereinafter GAO GGD-90-557). 
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Second, black defendants are more likely to be sentenced to death regardless of the race 
of their victims. An extensive 1998 study of Philadelphia death penalty cases found that 
black defendants were 38% more likely to be sentenced to death, even when the 
researches controlled for the severity of the homicide.75 The GAO confirmed that 75% 
of the 28 studies it surveyed in 1990 found that black defendants were more likely to 
receive the death penalty than white defendants.76 
 
When these two factors are taken together, the impact of race on capital sentencing is 
staggering. Since 1976, the United States has executed thirteen times more black 
defendants with white victims than white defendants with black victims.77 Such 
statistical disparities have led many of the most respected American jurists to call for 
the abolition of the death penalty altogether because of its racially disparate impact, 
among other factors.78 
The “War on Drugs” 
The United States government’s War on Drugs has perhaps contributed more than any 
other single factor to the racial disparities in the criminal justice system. Since its official 
beginning in 1982, the number of Americans incarcerated for drug offenses has 
skyrocketed from 41,000 in 1980 to nearly a half-million in 2007.79 Furthermore, 
harsher sentencing laws such as mandatory minimums keep drug offenders in prison 
for longer periods of time: in 1986, released drug offenders had spent an average of 22 
months in federal prison. By 2004, federal drug offenders were expected to serve almost 
three times that length: 62 months in prison.80 
 
Data demonstrates that the War on Drugs has been waged in racially disparate ways. 
From 1999-2005, African American constituted roughly 13% of drug users on average81 
but 36% of those arrested for drug offenses82 and 46% of those convicted for drug 
                                                 
75 David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and 
Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638 (1998). 
76 GAO GGD-90-557 at 6. 
77 Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-
1976#deathrowpop (last visited June 13, 2013). 
78 See, e.g., William Brennan, Jr., Neither Victims Nor Executioners, 8 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 1, 4 
(1994). 
79 Marc Mauer & Ryan King, A 25-Year Quagmire: The War on Drugs and Its Impact on American Society, 2 
(2007). 
80 Id. at 7-8. 
81 Marc Mauer, The Changing Racial Dynamics of the War on Drugs, 8 tbl.3 (2009). 
82 Id. at 10 tbl.5. 
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offenses.83 While the War on Drugs creates racial disparity at every phase of the 
criminal justice process, disparities in sentencing laws for various types of drugs and 
harsh mandatory minimum sentences disproportionately contribute to disparity. 
  
One of the most frequently decried aspects of the War on Drugs is the chronic disparity 
between federal sentencing laws for crack and powder cocaine offenses. For more than 
two decades, the ratio of the amount of powder cocaine needed to trigger the same 
sentence as an amount of crack cocaine was 100:1—even though crack and powder are 
pharmacologically identical.84 Because black Americans constitute 80% of those 
sentenced under federal crack cocaine laws each year,85 the disparity in sentencing laws 
leads to harsher sentences for black defendants for committing similar offenses to those 
of their white or Latino counterparts convicted of possessing powder cocaine. While 
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the crack/cocaine sentencing quantity disparity 
to 18:1, thousands continue to languish in prison serving sentences applied under the 
old laws because the act has not been applied retroactively.86 
  
Furthermore, the Fair Sentencing Act did nothing to alter the harsh federal mandatory 
minimum sentences imposed for virtually all drug offenses. Mandatory minimums are 
most often triggered by sale of a certain quantity of a given drug; federal law prescribes 
a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for sale of one gram of LSD, for example.87 
Once the mandatory minimum is triggered, judges must impose the mandatory sentence 
regardless of mitigating factors such as the defendant’s role in the offense or the 
likelihood of committing a future offense. In 2010, the number of black male offenders 
convicted of a federal offense subject to a mandatory minimum sentence was twice that 
of convicted white males.88 Mandatory minimum provisions doubled the average length 
of sentences received by black defendants, from 76 months for all federal offenses to 
152 months when the federal offense was subject to a mandatory minimum provision.89 
  
                                                 
83 Id. at 11 tbl.6. 
84 Alexander at 51. 
85 U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, tbl.34 (2012). 
86 Kara Gotsch, Breakthrough in U.S. Drug Sentencing Reform: The Fair Sentencing Act and the Unfinished 
Reform Agenda, 9 (2011). 
87 21 U.S.C. § 841. 
88 United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System, 142 fig.7-15 (Oct. 2011). 
89 Id. at 139 tbl.7-3. 
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The blind application of mandatory minimums often leads to travesties of justice like 
the case of Tonya Drake, a twenty-five year old mother of four on welfare. A stranger 
on the street approached her, gave her a $100 bill and a package, and told her that if she 
mailed the package for him she could keep the change—which amounted to $47.40. 
Unbeknownst to Tonya Drake, the package contained crack cocaine. She is now serving 
ten years in federal prison. At her sentencing hearing, Judge Richard Gadbois, Jr., said, 
“This woman doesn’t belong in prison for ten years for what I understand she did. 
That’s just crazy, but there’s nothing I can do about it.”90 
  
Unfortunately, Tonya Drake’s story is far from an anomaly in the War on Drugs. 
Literally hundreds of thousands of Americans—disproportionately Americans of 
color—have seen their lives ravaged by the U.S.’s policies regarding drug activity. The 
War on Drugs is a perfect illustration of the way the effects of racial bias become 
amplified as defendants move through the criminal justice system: bias causes law 
enforcement officers to stop, search, and arrest racial minorities at disproportionate 
rates; minority defendants bear a disproportionate risk of facing stiff charges but have 
smaller chances of receiving a substantial assistance departure or being represented by 
effective defense counsel; they are more likely to be convicted by juries and trial judges 
on similar evidence; and they are likely to receive harsher penalties for similar crimes. 
Each step in the process further widens the racial gap in the criminal justice system. 
 
CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: DISCRETION, RACIAL BIAS, AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 
Even as the effects of racial bias on every aspect of the criminal justice system have 
become increasingly well documented and understood, opportunities for meaningful 
reform have been increasingly foreclosed. Over the past half-century, various Supreme 
Court decisions have refused to acknowledge the importance of implicit racial bias and 
have therefore allowed its effects on the criminal justice system to flourish. This process 
occurs in two phases: first, the Court grants law enforcement officials and prosecutors 
wide discretion in determining whom to stop, search, arrest, and charge, thereby 
increasing the opportunity for racial bias to influence decisionmaking. Second, the 
Court shuts down challenges to such policies rooted in evidence of their racially 
disparate impact, requiring instead that plaintiffs show explicit and intentional 
discrimination on the part of criminal justice personnel. The colorblindness of the 
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Constitution—once a hallmark of the protections of minority rights in the United 
States—has instead become a mechanism whereby racial minorities are frequently 
locked out of the courthouse and into prison cells. 
Increasing Discretion of Law Enforcement Personnel 
Two lines of precedent over the past forty years have drastically expanded the 
discretion of law enforcement personnel under the Fourth Amendment, which protects 
citizens against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”  The first began with Terry v. Ohio 
in 1968, in which the Supreme Court held that a brief investigatory stop did not require 
police to meet the full probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment. 91 Rather, 
such a stop is constitutional so long as police possess “reasonable suspicion that crime 
is afoot.”92 Furthermore, if there is reason to believe that a suspect might be armed or 
carrying contraband, police may conduct a brief “frisk” of a suspect’s person. In the 45 
years since Terry was decided police forces across the United States have used the 
language in Terry to justify employing “stop and frisk” tactics for an ever-expanding list 
of reasons. In New York City, for example, the justification for officers’ reasonable 
suspicion in more than fifty percent of stops was “furtive movements”—a nebulous 
term that has escaped precise definition by even the most seasoned police veterans.93  
  
The second line of precedent involves “consent searches,” which allow police officers 
to circumvent the probable cause requirement when suspects voluntarily consent to be 
searched. While consent searches have always been a standard law enforcement practice 
in the U.S., the Court significantly diluted the meaning of “voluntary” in the 1991 case 
Florida v. Bostick. 94 The Court ruled that the appropriate test for whether consent is 
voluntary is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the 
encounter with the police. Applying the test to Bostick’s case, the Court determined a 
reasonable person on a crowded bus with police standing over him, displaying badges 
and guns and blocking his exit, should have felt free to terminate the encounter.95 
  
In so ruling, the Supreme Court ignored the coercion inherent in every citizen 
interaction with the police. As Judge Prentice Marshall observed in a different case, 
“implicit in the introduction of the officer and the initial questioning is a show of 
                                                 
91 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
92 Id. at 30. 
93 Fagan at 22 tbl.11. 
94 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
95 Id. at 439. 
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authority to which the average person encountered will feel obliged to stop and 
respond. Few will feel that they can walk away or refuse an answer.”96 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that one officer testified that he had searched more than 3,000 
bags without once being refused consent.97  
Lowering the Standard for Indigent Defense Counsel 
While the Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright guarantees defendants the right to 
counsel in all criminal trials, two cases decided together in 1984, Strickland v. 
Washington98 and United States v. Cronic,99 have allowed the quality of indigent defense to 
diminish by lowering the standard of what is considered competent performance by 
defense attorneys in criminal trials. In the words of Georgetown Law Professor David 
Cole, “too often, assistance of counsel for the poor can be like getting brain surgery 
from a podiatrist.”100 
 
In Strickland and Cronic, the Court established “a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”101 In order 
to overcome such a “highly deferential” standard, defendants must prove that their 
attorneys’ performance was “outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.”102 Defendants must then prove that their attorneys’ incompetence 
prejudiced the outcome of their trials—in other words, that there is a “reasonable 
probability that the result would have been different” if the defendants had received 
effective counsel.103  
  
Application of the Strickland standard by the U.S. federal judiciary has exacerbated the 
“state of crisis” in indigent defense. Very few defendants have been able to meet the 
Strickland standard to have their convictions invalidated due to ineffective indigent 
defense counsel; consequently, federal, state, and local governments have been 
permitted to underfund and understaff their public defense agencies. Courts have found 
that defendants failed to meet the Strickland standard when their defense counsel slept 
during portions of the trial, when counsel abused cocaine and heroin throughout the 
                                                 
96 Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F.Supp. 882, 889 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
97 Cole at 16. 
98 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
99 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
100 Cole at 76-77. 
101 Id. at 689. 
102 Id. at 690. 
103 Id. at 694. 
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course of the trial, and when counsel admitted that he was not prepared on the law or 
the facts of the case.104 In one case, an attorney in a capital murder trial was found 
competent even though he “consumed large amounts of alcohol each day of the trial, 
drank in the morning, during court recess, and throughout the evening, and was 
arrested during jury selection for driving to the courthouse with a .27 blood-alcohol 
content.”105 The attorney’s alcoholism was so severe that he died of the disease 
between the end of the trial and the date the California Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in the case.106 
Closing the Door to Challenges Based on Racially Disparate Impact 
As the Court has expanded discretion in some areas of the criminal justice system, it has 
refused to hear challenges based on the racially disparate impact of such discretion in 
two others: prosecution and capital punishment.   
 
In the 1896 decision of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court established that selective 
prosecution—the practice of only charging defendants of a certain race of certain 
crimes—was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
Yet in the 127 years since Yick Wo, the Court has not invalidated a single federal or state 
criminal case because prosecutors exercised their discretion in a racially disparate 
manner. Rather, the Court has made claims of selective prosecution—like claims of 
ineffective defense counsel—practically impossible to prove.  
 
In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Armstrong that defendants must 
prove a “colorable showing” of selective prosecution before proceeding even to the 
discovery phase of trial.107 Because the vast majority of the evidence that would prove 
claims of selective prosecution is in prosecutors’ offices, defendants cannot access it 
without the authority of court orders that arise from discovery motions. By refusing to 
allow claims of selective prosecution to advance to discovery unless the defendant 
proves a “colorable showing,” the Court essentially requires defendants to prove a claim 
in order to get access to the evidence they need to prove it. 
  
In an attempt to meet the “colorable showing” standard, Armstrong’s lawyers 
submitted evidence demonstrating that no white individuals had been prosecuted for 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989). 
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107 517 U.S. 456 (1992). 
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crack cocaine offenses in a three-year period. Additionally, the defense submitted two 
sworn statements. The first recounted the observation of a halfway house intake 
coordinator that in his experience treating crack addicts, whites and blacks dealt and 
used the drug equally. In the second, a defense attorney stated that many white 
defendants were prosecuted for crack offenses in state court. The government also 
submitted a list of 2,400 individuals charged with crack offenses over a three-year 
period; all but eleven were black and none were white. Yet the Court overturned the 
trial court’s finding that such evidence was enough to meet the colorable showing 
standard, finding that Armstrong’s evidence was insufficient even to warrant further 
investigation in the discovery phase.  
 
In 1987, the Supreme Court faced the most conclusive evidence demonstrating the link 
between race and the criminal justice system it had ever seen in McCleskey v. Kemp.108 
McCleskey, a black man sentenced to death in Georgia, argued that the implementation 
of the death penalty in Georgia violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution because of its racially disparate impact. To support his claims, McCleskey 
relied on an exhaustive study conducted by Professor David Baldus and his colleagues 
who studied more than 2,000 murder cases in Georgia in the 1970s. As in Baldus’s later 
study in Philadelphia, the Georgia study revealed that black defendants with white 
victims were significantly more likely to be sentenced to death than white defendants 
with black victims.109 
 
In its 5-4 majority opinion, the Court called into question the reliability of the Baldus 
study, but ultimately ruled that the study’s validity did not matter. Even if the Baldus 
study were accurate and vast racial disparities existed in Georgia’s implementation of 
capital punishment, the Court decided, it was not cruel and unusual punishment unless 
McCleskey and similarly situated black defendants could show that the prosecutor, 
judge, or jury acted with intentional racial animus in their specific cases. Since traditional 
rules in both the federal and state criminal justice systems bar defendants from probing 
into prosecutors’ and juries’ motivations, such a showing is practically impossible to 
make. Unless a jury member or prosecutor voluntarily admits to acting for racially 
biased reasons—taboo in the United States’ colorblind society—minority defendants 
                                                 
108 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
109 In the Georgia study, black defendants with white victims were sentenced to death 22% of the time while 
white defendants with black victims received the death penalty 3% of the time. The disparity held true even when 
the study factored in thirty nonracial factors such as multiple murders, long criminal records, or strong 
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cannot challenge the racially disparate impact of capital punishment under the 
Constitution. Not surprisingly, the McCleskey standard has never been met.110 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE 
As the evidence presented in this report indicates, the causes of the racial disparities in 
the U.S. criminal justice system are complex and deeply rooted. While the laws of the 
United States may be facially colorblind, a growing body of evidence shows that the 
individuals who apply such laws do not make cognitively colorblind decisions.  As 
studies repeatedly demonstrate, the belief that the United States of the present is 
unaffected by the centuries of its explicitly racist past—while perhaps well-
intentioned—is at best wishful thinking and potentially blinds decision makers to the 
implicit racial bias that lingers in the American consciousness.  
 
There are concrete measures, however, that the United States can adopt to reduce both 
the existence and the effects of racial bias in its criminal justice system. Eliminating 
racial disparity in its criminal justice system will not be easy for the United States, but it 
can and must take steps to do so in order to uphold its obligations under its own 
constitution and international law. As such, The Sentencing Project respectfully urges 
the Committee to recommend that the United States adopt the following ten measures. 
1. Establish a National Criminal Justice Commission. 
The United States should establish a National Criminal Justice Commission to examine 
incarceration and racial disparities. The commission should develop recommendations 
for systemic reform of the criminal justice system at the federal, state, and local levels. 
2. Scale back the War on Drugs. 
The United States should substantially scale back its War on Drugs. Specifically, the 
Department of Justice should reconsider and reduce the volume of low-level drug 
offenders prosecuted in federal court. The resources saved by decreasing the number of 
prosecutions should be invested in evidence-based drug prevention and treatment 
measures. 
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3. Eliminate mandatory minimum sentences. 
The United States should eliminate mandatory minimum sentences. Judges should be 
allowed to consider individual case characteristics when sentencing a defendant in every 
case.  
4. Abolish capital punishment. 
The United States should abolish capital punishment. Regardless of its other moral 
implications, history has repeatedly demonstrated that the capital punishment system of 
the United States cannot operate in a racially neutral manner. At the very least, the 
United States should pay particular attention to increasing the quality of defense 
representation in capital cases and increase oversight of such cases to ensure that they 
are administered as fairly and race-neutrally as possible. 
5. Fully fund indigent defense agencies. 
The United States should fully fund and staff indigent defense agencies. The federal 
government should increase the number and value of grants specifically allocated for 
indigent defense and establish oversight and accountability systems to ensure such 
funds are used as intended. The government should also ensure that state and local 
governments know which discretionary grants can be used to fund indigent defense 
agencies and encourage them to use an appropriate portion of discretionary grant 
funding for that purpose. The United States should provide funding and resources 
sufficient for the defense bar to operate at the same level of effectiveness at trial as 
prosecutors. 
6. Adopt a policy requiring the use of racial impact statements. 
The United States should adopt a policy requiring the use of racial impact statements 
for proposed sentencing policies. Such a policy would require legislators to prepare an 
analysis assessing the possible racial consequences of any proposed legislation before 
enacting it in order to avoid any unintended disparate racial effects.111 Three states—
Iowa, Connecticut, and Oregon—have adopted racial impact statements since 2008. 
7. Allow social framework evidence and structural reform litigation in trials. 
The United States should modify its racial discrimination jurisprudence in two ways: 
permit social framework evidence and structural reform litigation. The admission of 
social framework evidence in discrimination trials would permit juries and judges to 
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consider expert testimony regarding the general existence and effects of implicit bias 
against racial minorities in reaching verdicts in discrimination cases against specific 
entities.112 Structural reform litigation would allow racial minorities to challenge specific 
government policies as discriminatory on the basis of their demonstrated racially 
disparate impact without being required to prove intentional racial discrimination.113 
Under a structural reform litigation model, the plaintiff in McCleskey v. Kemp would have 
been allowed to proceed with his case by relying on the evidence that black men were 
significantly more likely than white men to receive the death penalty in Georgia without 
needing to show that any individual actor in his specific case had acted in an 
intentionally discriminatory manner. Though some limited precedent already exists for 
both social framework evidence and structural reform litigation in American 
jurisprudence,114 the U.S. Congress should solidify their existence and importance by 
codifying them in Titles VI, VII, and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.115 
  
One state has provided a model for how social framework evidence could be 
incorporated into existing law. In 2009, North Carolina enacted the Racial Justice Act, 
which prohibited prosecutors or courts from seeking or imposing the death penalty on 
the basis of race. The act allowed death row inmates to challenge their sentences using 
social framework evidence, including statistics that demonstrated the racially disparate 
application of the death penalty in their districts. If defendants proved that race was a 
significant factor in the imposition of the death penalty in their cases, their sentences 
were automatically commuted to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 
Unfortunately, North Carolina repealed the Racial Justice Act in 2013 after Gov. Pat 
McCrory stated that the law effectively shut down capital punishment in the state.116 
8. Enact the Racial Profiling Act of 2013. 
The United States should enact the End Racial Profiling Act of 2013. Indeed, the act 
serves as a model of what effective racial bias legislation could look like in every area of 
the criminal justice system. The act, reintroduced into the United States Senate by 
                                                 
112 Id. at 493-94. 
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114 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
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Senator Ben Cardin in May 2013, would prohibit racial profiling, mandate training on 
racial profiling for federal law enforcement officials, and require that federal officials 
collect data on the racial impact of all routine or spontaneous investigatory activities. 
The act would also make federal funds to state and local law enforcement agencies 
contingent on their adoption of effective policies that prohibit racial profiling. Finally, 
the act would authorize the Department of Justice to provide grants for the 
development of effective, non-discriminatory policing practices and require the attorney 
general to provide periodic reports to assess the ongoing effects of any practices that 
have been shown to be racially discriminatory. 
9. Develop and implement training to reduce racial bias. 
The United States should develop and implement training designed to mitigate the 
influence of implicit racial bias for every actor at every level of the criminal justice 
system: police officers, public defenders, prosecutors, judges, and jury members. While 
it is difficult to eliminate completely racial bias at the individual level, studies have 
repeatedly shown that it is possible to control for the effects of implicit racial bias on 
individual decisionmaking.117 In other words, while it may be impossible in the current 
culture of the United States to ensure that individuals are cognitively colorblind, it is 
possible to train individuals to be behaviorally colorblind.118 The United States should 
work with leading scholars on implicit bias to develop the most effective training 
programs to reduce the influence of implicit racial bias. 
10. Adopt racial disparity-conscious policies.  
Finally, as a general measure, the United States should adopt policies that reflect a basic 
understanding that while laws that are racially neutral on their face represent admirable 
progress in the struggle against racism in the U.S., such facial neutrality has proven 
insufficient to eliminate racial bias and consequently racial disparity in the criminal 
justice system. Policies should be guided instead by an awareness that facially colorblind 
laws may be applied in a racially disparate manner due to both implicit racial bias and 
                                                 
117 See, e.g., Ashby Plant & Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers’ Response to 
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explicit racial discrimination. The United States should affirmatively adopt a 
commitment to behavioral realism—the idea that the law should be based on the most 
accurate model of human thought, decisionmaking, and action provided by the 
sciences—called for by Professors Jerry Kang and Kristen Lane.119 Such a concept is 
not unprecedented in American jurisprudence: one of the most celebrated Supreme 
Court decisions in U.S. history, Brown v. Board of Education, relied on behavioral realism 
in overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine; the Supreme Court’s reasoning in that 
case was based on advancing research in the study of psychology and the effects of 
segregation on schoolchildren.120 
  
The foregoing suggestions by no means constitute an exhaustive list of steps the United 
States could and should take to begin to address the racial disparities in its criminal 
justice system. Nevertheless, The Sentencing Project earnestly believes that these steps 
are firmly within the purview of the United States government and would substantially 
reduce existing racial disparity while dramatically improving the quality and integrity of 
the criminal justice system. While many of these steps are admittedly difficult, each one 
is vital if the United States is to fulfill its obligations to its citizens and the international 
community. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, the United States of America has employed mass incarceration as a 
convenient answer to inconvenient questions. In doing so, the U.S. government has 
glossed over the glaring racial inequalities that permeate every aspect of its criminal 
justice system. The government has both fostered and perpetuated those inequalities in 
clear violation of its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights as well as other international agreements. 
  
More importantly, however, the proliferation of racial disparities in the U.S. criminal 
justice system has a real impact on the lives of people of color living in the United 
States. Behind each statistic lies the face of a young black man whose potential has been 
cut short by a harsh prison sentence mandated by draconian drug laws. Behind each 
percentage point lies the face of a Latina child who will only know her parents through 
                                                 
119 See Jerry Kang & Kristen Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. 
Rev. 465, 466 (2010). 
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hurried, awkward visits in a prison visitation room. Behind each dataset lies a 
community of color bereft of hope because its young people have been locked away. 
  
It is the human face—a face of color—of the racial injustice of the United States 
criminal justice system that is the most compelling reason for reform. It is time for the 
United States to take affirmative steps to eliminate the racial disparities in its criminal 
justice system. 
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